期刊论文

中文

管理学报

1672-884X

2016

13

5

755-762

10.3969/j.issn.1672-884x.2016.05.015

国家自然科学基金资助项目(71471021) 重庆市研究生科研创新基金资助项目(CYB15003) 衡阳市社会科学基金资助项目(2014D018) 衡阳师范学院科学基金资助项目(13A05)

本校为其他机构

存在供应风险的情形下,研究供应商可通过付出努力同时改善供应可靠性和降低单位生产成本时的供应链决策问题。分别构建集中决策模型和分散决策下以供应商作为主导的斯坦伯格博弈和讨价还价博弈模型。研究发现,讨价还价博弈下的最优努力程度和采购数量与集中决策模式下相等,且都大于斯坦伯格博弈下的最优努力程度和采购数量,但供应商的批发价格会变小。讨价还价博弈下能够实现整个供应链收益的最大化。然而,制造商并不总是偏向于讨价还价模式,只有当其具备一定谈判力时才会倾向于讨价还价模式。对于供应商来说,只有当谈判力较小时,其主导的斯坦伯格博弈能带来更多的收益。

This study examines supply chain decisions when the supplier,who is unreliable,can initiate effort to improve its reliability and reduce its unit production cost.With the centralized decision model as benchmark,we focus on two decentralized decision models：a Stackelberg model（supplier as the leader）and a bargaining model.The supplier＇s optimal effort and manufacturer＇s order quantity in the bargaining model are equal to those in the centralized decision model and more than those in Stackelberg model.The supplier＇s wholesale price in the b...