[贺位位; 邹祎; 刘波涛; Li, Lang] Department of Computer Science, Hengyang Normal University, Hengyang, Hunan, 421008, China;[Li, Lang; 李浪] College of Information Science and Engineering, Hunan University, Changsha, Hunan, 410082, China
Department of Computer Science, Hengyang Normal University, Hengyang, Hunan, China
International Journal of Performability Engineering,2019年15(5):1436-1444 ISSN：0973-1318
College of Computer Science and Technology, Hengyang Normal University, Hengyang, 421002, China;Hunan Provincial Key Laboratory of Intelligent Information Processing and Application, Hengyang, 421002, China;School of Environment Protection and Safety Engineering, University of South China, Hengyang, 421002, China
College of Computer Science and Technology, Hengyang Normal University, Hengyang, China
[Sha, Edwin H-M; 李浪; 李仁发; 章竞竞] School of Computers and Communications, Hunan University, Changsha 410082, China;[李浪] Department of Computer Science, Hengyang Normal University, Hengyang, Hunan 421008, China;[童元满] School of Computer Science, National University of Defense Technology, Changsha 410073, China;[Sha, Edwin H-M] Department of Computer Science, University of Texas at Dallas, Richardson 75083, United States
School of Computers and Communications, Hunan University, China
Communications in Computer and Information Science
Differential Power Analysis;SMS4;Fixed-Value Masking Algorithm;Trusted Computing System
Side channel attacks could efficiently break cryptographic algorithm based on hardware implementation including applications on trusted computing systems. Chinese researchers had proposed a standard encryption algorithm, called SMS4, for their own wireless LAN communications in 2006. In this paper, we propose a modified fixed-value masking algorithm for SMS4 in order to resist again power analysis attack to hardware based SMS4. Furthermore, we simulate the attacking environments and port the proposed countermeasure to FPGA platform. The experimental results show that the proposed countermeasure can efficiently resist against power analysis attack.
We propose a new ultra-lightweight block cipher, QTL. The 64 bits block cipher QTL supports 64 and 128 bits keys. To solve the slow diffusion of the traditional Feistel-type structures we have used a new variant of generalized Feistel network structure in design of the QTL. Traditional Feistel-type structures change only half of block messages in an iterative round, but our structure overcomes this disadvantage and changes all block messages. Thus, our structure has the fast diffusion of the Substitution Permutation Networks (SPNs) structures, which improves the security of lightweight block cipher in Feistel-type structures. Moreover, QTL algorithm has the same encryption and decryption processes, so it will occupy less area in resource-constrained applications. Furthermore, to reduce the cost of energy consumption in hardware implementation of the cipher while maintaining security, we decide not to use a key schedule. We show that QTL offers an adequate security level against classic analyses. Our hardware implementation for the 64 and the 128 bits keys modes only require 1025.52 and 1206.52 gate equivalents, respectively. QTL achieves high security and compact implementation in hardware. QTL is one of the most competitive ultra-lightweight block ciphers, which is suitable for extremely constrained devices. (C) 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.